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Abstract
This Article explores the S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG (“Hag II”) judgment of October
17, 1990, of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and how the decision offers an
opportunity to elaborate on the role of consent in reconciling the principle of the free movement
of goods with the existence of national intellectual property rights in European Community law.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE ROLE OF CONSENT AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN RECONCILING
ARTICLES 30 AND 36 IN HAG I
AND HAG II
Anna Lo Monaco*
INTRODUCTION
The S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG ("Hag II") judgment of October 17, 1990 of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the "Community Court" or "Court") offers an opportunity to elaborate on the role of consent in reconciling the principle of the free movement of goods with the
existence of national intellectual property rights in European
Community law ("EEC law").
The judgment recognized the right of Hag GF AG ("German Hag") to restrain imports of decaffeinated coffee lawfully
marketed in another Member State under the Hag trademark.
In so doing, the Court expressly overruled the doctrine of
common origin formulated by the Court in Van Zuylen Frres v.
Hag AG ("Hag I"),' and re-established a more favorable approach to the protection of trademark rights. This new approach, based on the absence of consent and on some aspects
of consumer protection, recognized the importance of trademarks as an essential factor in a system of undistorted competition, which is one of the aims of the Treaty of Rome (the "EEC
Treaty").'
* Researcher, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy; LL. M., Fordham
University, 1991.
1. Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R -, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 [hereinafter Hag II].
2. Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 [hereinafter Hag I].
This is one of the most annotated and criticized cases in EEC law. See, e.g., F.A.
Mann, Industrial Property and the EEC Treaty, 24 Irr'L & COMP. L.Q 31 (1975); F.G.
Jacobs, Industrial Property and the EEC Treaty: a Reply, 24 Ier'L & COMP. L.Q. 643
(1975). It is interesting to note that Advocate General Jacobs has changed position
since then. In this comment he considered unconvincing the criticism that the Hag I
judgment was a source of deception on the ground that it would have been possible
to insist that the origin of the product be shown. Jacobs, supra, at 652.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1927, German Hag, the inventor and manufacturer of
Hag decaffeinated coffee, set up a wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary in Belgium under the name Caf6 Hag SA
("Belgian Hag"). A few years later, German Hag transferred
to Belgian Hag the trademarks which it had registered in its
own name in Belgium. After the Second World War, the Government expropriated Belgian Hag as enemy property and
transferred it to a third party. In 1971, Belgian Hag assigned
its trademark, which had been converted into Benelux registrations, to Van Zuylen Frres. In 1972, German Hag, having
failed to sell much coffee in Belgium under the "Decoffa"
trademark, began to sell its coffee in Luxembourg under the
"Hag" trademark. Van Zuylen Frres attempted to resist the
importation of coffee from Germany under the Hag designation, and brought an infringement proceeding which led to the
preliminary ruling in Hag I. In Hag I, the Court ruled that to
"prohibit the marketing in a Member State of a product legally
bearing a trademark in another Member State, for the sole reason that an identical trade mark having the same origin exists
in the first state, is incompatible with the provisions providing
for the free movement of goods." 4
About fifteen years later, the Community Court faced the
reverse situation in Hag I. In 1979, a Swiss company, Jacobs
Suchard AG, which is the market leader in coffee products in
Germany, succeeded to the interests of Van Zuylen FrZ'res and
restructured Belgian Hag as a wholly-owned subsidiary under
the name S.A. CNL-Sucal.' In 1985, S.A. CNL-Sucal began exporting coffee to Germany in packages which indicated its Belgian origin but which still used the trade name Hag.6 German
Hag resisted the imports on the ground of trademark infringement, maintaining that "Kaffee Hag" had acquired the status
of a famous brand in Germany, and that by virtue of a new
manufacturing process its product was superior in quality to
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
4. Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 744, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 144.
5. For a statement of the facts, see the decision of the Hanseatische Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal, Hamburg) in Re Hag Coffee, Case 3 U 133/86, [1989]
3 C.M.L.R. 154 (1987).
6. d. at 158.
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the coffee supplied by Belgian Hag. 7 The German courts upheld the position of German Hag, distinguishing Hag I on the
facts and in consideration of the developments of Community
law. 8 The Bundesgerichtshof, the German Federal Supreme
Court, referred the matter to the Community Court for a preliminary ruling.9
The Community Court based its ruling on the reasoning
of the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. The Advocate
General proposed that the Court make the following answer to
the Bundesgerichtshof:
Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty do not prevent an undertaking from relying on a trade mark of which it is the
proprietor in a member-State in order to oppose imports
from another member-State of similar goods bearing an
identical or confusingly similar trade mark which was originally owned by the same undertaking but was subsequently
acquired by an entirely unrelated undertaking without the
consent of the first undertaking.'
II. THE DOCTRINES OF "EXHAUSTION" AND
"COMMON ORIGIN"
Prior to the judgment in Hag II, the Court based its interpretation of articles 30 to 36 on two principles in order to prevent the use of trademarks to block imports. The first concept
was the doctrine of exhaustion." According to this doctrine,
7. The German government argued that German Hag, the original owner of the
Hag trademark, should be allowed to export to Belgium in accordance with the judgment in Hag I, but that the holder of the Belgian trademark should not be allowed to
export to Germany.
For the position of the German government, see Ren6 Joliet, Trade Mark Law and
the Free Movement of Goods: The Overruling of the Judgment in Hag 1, 22 11C 303 (1991).
On the Hag I judgment, see Peter Oliver, Of Split Trade Marks and Common Market,
MOD. L. REV. 587 (1991).

8. Judgment of the Hanseatische Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal,
Hamburg), [1988] GRUR Int. 256. For the English text of the decision, see Re Hag
Coffee, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 154 (1987). For a short comment on the case, see Ann
Marie De Die, Re Hag Coffee: Now the National Courts Decide, 4 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.

145 (1990).
9. Order of the Bundesgerichtshof of 24 November 1988, [1989] GRUR Int.
409. For the English text of the four questions submitted to the Community Court,
see OJ. C 43/4 (1989).
10. Hag II, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. -, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 605.
11. The doctrine of exhaustion was formulated in 1971 in Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grol~mirkte GmbH & Co. KG, Case 78/70,
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an intellectual property right cannot be invoked against the import of goods which have been put into circulation in another
Member State by the holder himself, by a third party with the
holder's consent, or by a person or undertaking which is legally or economically dependent upon the holder (the socalled "test of consent"). 12 The second concept, known as the
doctrine of common origin, was implied by the Court's judIgment in Hag .13 According to the doctrine of common origin,
a trademark holder cannot restrain the import into a Member
State of a product bearing the same trademark from another
Member State when the trademarks are of common origin.' 4
The test of consent did not apply to situations of common
origin. The doctrine of common origin refers to the separate
ownership of identical trademarks in different Member States
which had originally been held by a single owner.' 5 In situations of common origin, the reason for the separation of ownfrom expropriation to any
ership is irrelevant, and may range
16
other form of public compulsion.
[1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631, and carried further in Centrafarm BV &
Adriaan De Peijper v. Winthrop BV, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480.
12. See, e.g., Norbert Koch, Article 30 and the Exercise of Industrial Property Rights to
Block Imports, 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 605 (B. Hawk ed. 1987).
13. Hag I was only the second case in which the Community Court ruled on the
relationship between intellectual property rights and the principle of the free movement of goods. In Hag I the Court mentioned common origin four times but neither
formulated the principle nor explained its relevance. The doctrine of common origin
was reiterated and restricted to marks of common origin in Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd.
v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., Case 119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482.
14. Hag I, Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, 744, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127, 144.
15. An explanation ex post facto of the doctrine was given in Terrapin, where the
Community Court stated that
the proprietor of an industrial or commercial property right protected by
the law of a Member State cannot rely on that law to prevent the importation of a product which has lawfully been marketed in another Member State
by the proprietor himself or with his consent. It is the same when the right
relied on is the result of the subdivision, either by voluntary act or as a result
of public constraint, of a trade mark right which originally belonged to one
and the same proprietor. In these cases the basic function of the trade mark
to guarantee to consumers that the product has the same origin is already
undermined by the subdivision of the original right.
Terrapin, [1976] E.C.R. at 1061, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 505-06.
16. Id.
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III. HAG I v. HAG II
In Hag I, the absence of consent did not render the concept of common origin inapplicable. The mere existence of a
common origin of the trademark replaced the need for consent
despite the rupture caused by the Belgian sequestration.' 7
The functions of trademarks, to indicate the origin of the
goods and to prevent confusion in the mind of consumers
about goods of different origin, were thus ignored. The Court
pointed out that if the indication of origin on a product is useful, consumer confusion as to the origin of a product bearing
the same trademark could be avoided "by means other than
such as would affect the free movement of goods," because to
hinder the free movement of goods would legitimate the isolation of national markets.' 8
As Advocate General Francis Jacobs indicated in Hag II,
however, in the case of identical marks for identical products
no amount of additional information can prevent the risk of
consumer confusion.' 9 The purpose of an indication of origin
is to link a product to the owner of the trademark, so that the
owner becomes responsible for its quality and the uniformity
of its characteristics. 2 ' The mere fact that the coffee's packaging indicates that it is made in Belgium or in Germany may be
of no significance to consumers, who link certain perceptions
of the quality of goods with a particular trademark. Where the
holder has no more control of the characteristics of the product, and where there is no more linkage between the holders of
two identical trademarks, the holder cannot ensure that all
products sold under a particular mark possess similar quality.
As a result, the holder lacks the power to influence the goodwill associated with a trademark.
In Hag II, the coffee sold by Belgian Hag and German Hag
17. In Hag I the Court did not explain why the mere fact that the trademarks
were of common origin should be relevant, but simply stated that it is incompatible
with the principle of the free movement of goods. Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. at 744,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 144.
18. Id.
19. Hag II, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R..... [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 604.

20. The word "origin" in the context of trademark refers to the commercial origin of a product. The indication of origin given in a trademark is intended to identify
the party responsible for the product. See W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS § 15 (2nd ed. 1989).
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was of a different and better quality as a result of a new manufacturing procedure introduced in 1980.21 German Hag may
display this additional information on its packages, but it may
not force its competitors to do the same. After the forced sale,
no commercial relations remained between the original German owner and the Belgian owners. In circumstances such as
these, it is doubtful whether an indication of origin could adequately prevent consumer confusion. Consumers may 'not
know that the coffee marketed under the same brand name is
produced by two completely unaffiliated companies, thus leaving no guarantee as to the uniformity or quality of the product.
In Hag I, the Court did not inquire as to whether there existed
a disparity of quality that could confuse the public. 2 2 In the
conflict between the free movement of goods and consumer
protection, the former interest prevailed.
IV. THE COMMUNITY COURT'S REASONING IN HAG II
The Hag II judgment, however, based its conclusion on
grounds different from those in Hag I. Before replying to the
request filed by the Bundesgerichtshof, the Community Court,
accepting the Advocate General's recommendation, first stated
that it was necessary to reconsider the doctrine of common origin in light of developments in the case law with regard to the
relationship between intellectual property rights and the free
movement of goods. 2 3 The Court noted that, according to its
case law, article 36 allows derogations from the principle of
free movement of goods only to the extent that such derogations are justified by the need to safeguard the specific subject
matter of the trademark right.2"
21. See supra note 5.

22. The issue was raised by Van Zuylen Fr~res who pointed out that no links
existed between the two undertakings and no control over the quality of the Belgian
product could be exercised by German Hag. See Hag I, Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R.
731, 737, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127, 129. It is highly probable that the product marketed by German Hag and Belgian Hag was different. Even if the companies had
used the same process of decaffeination, it may be presumed that they used different
coffee beans. See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 652 n.14. Advocate General Jacobs noted
that from the consumer's point of view the real problem was to ensure that an inferior product was not passed off under the same trademark or packaging, although this
concern was not at issue in the case. Id. at 653.
23. Hag!!, [19901 E.C.R. at , [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 607. This is the only reference that the Court makes to Hag .
24. Id.
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The Court noted that trademarks are an essential element
of the system of undistorted competition that the EEC Treaty
seeks to establish. 5 Competing firms should be able to attract
and retain customers on the basis of the quality of their products and services. 26 This is possible through the use of distinc27
tive signs which associate a trademark with a certain quality.
In order to play this role, trademarks should guarantee that the
products bearing them are all made under the control of
the
28
holder who is responsible for the quality of the product.
Having established the limited circumstances in which article 36 permits derogation from its principles, and having described the role of trademarks, the Court then defined the specific subject matter and the essential function of trademarks.2 9
The specific subject matter is the exclusive right of the
trademark holder to place products bearing the trademark into
circulation for the first time, and to prevent competitors wishing to take advantage of the goodwill and reputation of the
trademark by selling products that illegally bear that trademark.30 The specific subject matter includes both the nature of
25. Id. at -_, [1990] C.M.L.R. at 607-08. One of the aims of the European Community set forth in Article 3 of the EEC Treaty is "the institution of a system ensuring
that competition in the Common Market is not distorted." EEC Treaty, supra note 3,
art. 3(f).
26. Hag II, [1990] E.C.R..... [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 608.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Court, once again following the Advocate General's opinion, fully
recognized the importance of trademarks under Community law and abandoned the
view expressed in Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l., Case 40/70, [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971]
C.M.L.R. 260, where it affirmed that
the exercise of a trade-mark right is particularly apt to lead to a partitioning
of markets, and thus to impair the free movement of goods between States
which is essential to the Common Market. Moreover, a trade-mark right is
distinguishable in this context from other rights of industrial and commercial property, inasmuch as the interests protected by the latter are usually
more important, and merit a higher degree of protection, than the interests
protected by an ordinary trade-mark.
Id. at 82, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 273.
29. Hag 11, [1990] E.C.R. at -, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 608.
30. Id. The specific subject matter of intellectual property rights was first mentioned in a copyright case, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SBGroBmarkte GmbH & Co. KG, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631,
and defined further in a trademark case, Centrafarm BV & Adriaan De Peijper v.
Winthrop BV, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480. Its definition
was repeated in later judgments in a similar way. See Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG
v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 102/
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the right-that is, the right to restrain others-and its purpose,
which is to protect the information provided by the trademark.
This possibility of product differentiation is an incentive to
provide goods of superior quality. In order to determine the
exact scope of this exclusive right, it is necessary to take into
account the essential function of trademarks, which is to guarantee the origin of the marked product to the consumers."' A
trademark can trigger in the minds of consumers an association between the origin of a good and its value.
The Court explained that the crucial factor in the present
case was the absence of any element of consent on the part of
German Hag to the activities of Belgian Hag. 2 The Court,
qualifying the element of consent, explained that consent is
crucial because consumers otherwise cannot identify with certainty the origin of a product marked with an identical or confusingly similar trademark. 3 As a result, the poor quality of a
product might be attributed to the owner of a trademark
although he was not responsible for it. 4 In the Court's view,
consent is crucial because it ensures the protection of consumers from fraud and confusion. 35 It is this concern for consumer protection that motivates the protection of the interest
of the trademark owner.
The Court stated that its analysis was not affected by the
fact that the trademark protected under national law and the
similar trademark of the imported product both belonged originally to the same holder.3 6 From the time of the expropriation of Belgian Hag, and despite their common origin, each
trademark independently performed the role of guaranteeing
that the product bearing the trademark came from a single
37
source.
The Court, therefore, did not base its judgment on mere
77, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217; Centrafarm BV v. American Home
Products Corp., Case 3/78, [1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326.
31. Hag II, [1990] E.C.R ....

[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 608.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. The Court followed the Advocate General's view that without trademark
protection there would be little incentive for manufacturers to develop new products
or to maintain the quality of existing ones. Id. at -, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 583.
36. Id. at -, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 609.
37. Id.
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unqualified consent. If this had been the case, German Hag
would have been able to prevent the access of Belgian Hag to
the German market while retaining access to the Belgian market. According to Hag II, however, each trademark owner may
object to the import into the Member State where he owns the
trademark of products of the other owner, when the products
bear the38same trademark or may lead to confusion among consumers.

This concept is in line with the rationale of Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co. ," where the
Court held that when a risk of confusion between two trademarks exists, the holder of a trademark may rely on his trademark to prevent other persons from importing goods under
the identical or confusingly similar trademark. °
V. HAG II IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COURT'S CASE LA W
There are no clear indications as to whether the consent
to marketing or the prevention of consumer confusion, dictated by the essential function of trademarks, will prevail in the
judgments of the Court.
In Hag II, the application of the two tests led to the same
result because the interests of the trademark holder and of the
consumers coincided. This may not always be the case, as
shown in cases concerning the repackaging of pharmaceutical
products. In these cases, the interests of trademark holders
are protected only if no repackaging is allowed, although the
Community Court has permitted repackaging and relabelling
under certain conditions in order to ensure adequate consumer protection.4" The Court seemed to invoke the essential
function of trademarks when consent is inadequate, and to allow trademark holders to use their right to block imports when
the protection of end users is involved.
The Court has frequently referred to the relevance of con38. Id.
39. Case 119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482.
40. Id. at 1062, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 506.
41. See Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, Case 1/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2913,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 406; Centrafarm BV v. American Home Products Corp., Case 3/
78, [1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.
Centrafarm Vertriebsgeseilschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 102/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217.
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sent in cases involving other intellectual property rights. Cases
42
such as Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar BV & Petrus Stephanus Exler
and Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG 4 3 suggest that marketing-with
or without consent-is the only element considered by the
Court.
In Merck, the Court held that a Dutch patentee could not
rely on its Dutch patent to block imports from another Member State, Italy, where the goods had been put into circulation
by the patentee or with its consent, even though the absence of
patent protection in Italy deprived Merck of the possibility of
44
deriving monopoly profits from its sales there.
In contrast, in Pharmon the Court confirmed the right of a
patent holder to prevent the importation and marketing of
products which were legally manufactured and put into circulation in the exporting country on the basis of a compulsory license, because this occurred without the consent of the patent
holder.4 5 The Court held that the doctrine of consent does not
apply in the context of compulsory licensing because there can
be no element of consent in a compulsory licensing situation.4 6
If the requirement of consent were waived as in the case of a
compulsory license, the patent owner would be deprived "of
his right to determine freely the conditions under which he
' 47
markets his products.
In patent cases, it is not consumer protection but the possibility of securing an adequate reward that is at stake. In more
recent cases, the Court has emphasized the need for such rewards and incentives. In Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma SpA, 48 the
Court stated that a U.K. law that permitted the granting of a
patent if there had been no patent specification in the last fifty
years did not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction of trade because it might encourage inventiveness
in rediscovery. The Court recognized that the expectation of
reward is the incentive to investment, and that it is necessary
"to foster creative activity on the part of the inventors in the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Case 187/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463.
Case 19/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2281, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775.
Merck, [1981] E.C.R. at 2081-82, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 481.
Pharmon, [1985] E.C.R. at 2298, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 791.
Id.
Id.
Case 35/87, [1988] E.C.R. 3585, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 549.
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interest of industry." 4 9

In the field of copyright, the Court has permitted the qualification and limitation of the role of consent to ensure an adequate return for the copyright holder.5 ° The Court in Warner
Bros. & Metronome Video ApS v. Erik Viuff Christiansen51 rejected

the traditional analysis of exhaustion made by Advocate General Mancini.52 It ruled that the holder of the Danish copyright
could prevent a Danish video shop from renting video cassettes bought in the United Kingdom, where at that time no
copyright protection for such rentals existed.53 The Danish
law extending copyright protection to rentals came within article 36 of the EEC Treaty because of both the importance of the
rental market and the need for the copyright holder to earn a
sufficient reward.54
CONCLUSION
In Hag II, the Court refers in paragraph 15 of the judgment to the absence of any element of consent as the determining factor of its decision, but in subsequent paragraphs
gives prominence to the essential function of trademark.
Moreover, the Court links consent to the essential function
and role of trademarks in a system of undistorted competition.
Hag H suggests that the Court is more receptive to the
protection of trademark rights. The opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in describing the doctrine of common origin as unjustified on grounds of policy and the text of the EEC Treaty,
criticized the Court's previous disappreciation of trademarks
and recognized their necessity for the development of a market. Hag II is evidence of the Court's strong and renewed willingness to recognize the value and importance of trademarks.
49. Id. at 3607, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 561.
50. See EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, Case 341/87, [1989]
E.C.R. 79, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413; Warner Bros. Inc. and Metronome Video ApS v.
Erik Viuff Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684; G.
Basset v. Soci~t6 des auteurs, compositeurs et 6diteurs de musique (SACEM), Case
402/85, [1987] E.C.R. 1747, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 173; S.A. Compagnie G~nrale pour
la Diffusion de la T6i6vision, Coditel v. S.A. Cin6 Vog Films, Case 62/79, [1980]
E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362.
51. Case 158/68, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684.
52. Id. at 2618, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 689-90.
53. Id. at 2629, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 699.
54. Id., [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 698.

